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Introduction 
1.1. The problem 
Since NAFTA, the United States and Canada have initiated programs to address cross-border 
transportation and anticipated increases in North American trade and travel.  In 1999, The United 
States, through its multi-year transportation authorization act, began the Coordinated Border 
Infrastructure Program (CBI). This program, focused on border transportation investments, also 
established federal support for regional, binational planning coalitions.  In 2000, U.S. Secretary of 
Transportation Rodney Slater and Canadian Minister of Transportation David Collenette signed a 
memorandum of cooperation to collaborate on transportation issues of mutual interest. This quickly 
led to the formation of the U.S.-Canada Transportation Border Working Group (TBWG) in the 
same year.  In 2002, the Canadian federal government unveiled the Border Infrastructure Fund 
(BIF). 
These initial efforts encouraged cooperation across the border, cooperation between agencies, and 
set up ongoing dialog to improve awareness of issues and best practices. The heighted level of 
collaboration resulting from these initiatives has been most beneficial at the project implementation 
stage. During construction of a project or installation of operational enhancements, recently 
improved awareness of cross-border system dynamics, binational perspective, and binational 
professional networks within border management and operation agencies has been a benefit to both 
countries and individual border regions. 
The above efforts however have not established a longer-view assessment of how our countries and 
agencies might collaborate on border transportation policy and planning for operations and 
infrastructure. While it is true that the majority of each country’s executive level statements on the 
importance of trade, transportation, and security are in accord, the collaborative efforts fostered by 
friendship, adjacency, social likeness, and post-NAFTA continental partnership in a globalized 
economy have not gotten to a place where both countries, together identify mutual expectations of 
the cross-border transportation system. Instead, with regard to cross-border transportation, the U.S. 
and Canada continue to separately develop strategic policy, planning, and investment programs and 
stop short of using forums like the TBWG to form or inform a shared strategy for border planning 
and development. 
 
1.2. Perspective – the author 
My perspective in identifying this research topic and writing this paper comes from 14 years of 
working with a regional cross-border planning coalition, the International Mobility and Trade 
Corridor Project (IMTC). Facilitating cross border interagency collaboration through IMTC, 
conducting periodic planning studies, and advancing improvement projects for regional cross-border 
transportation and inspection systems is the primary focus of my work at the Whatcom Council of 
Governments, a U.S. metropolitan planning organization (MPO). Additionally, since 2002, I have 
participated with the U.S.-Canada Transportation Border Working Group (TBWG), a federal level 
coordinating body for cross-border transportation issues. I currently serve on the TBWG Steering 
Committee and as a co-chair of the TBWG Policy Subcommittee.  
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1.3. Audience 
This project’s primary audiences are the U.S. and Canadian federal governments (the U.S. Federal 
Highway Administration and Transport Canada) as they continue joint efforts on collaborative 
improvement of our shared border. The policy alternatives outlined below will address a variety of 
persistent obstacles and missing pieces that currently limit the potential depth of coordination on 
planning and programming. 
A detailed review of how transportation-planning coordination could be improved would also 
benefit states and provinces by helping them clarify and normalize their roles as necessary partners 
in border management and operation. 
 
1.4. Report structure 
This report is organized in four sections. A literature review will survey existing material and current, 
documented discussion focused on comparing and contrasting the administrative mechanics of U.S. 
and Canadian federal agencies. Existing collaborative arrangements will be considered as well as legal 
obstacles to more predictable program alignment. 
The body of the report will draw on identified literature, recent work of existing cross-border 
working groups, interviews with participants in ongoing cross-border work, and the most current 
actions of U.S and Canadian federal executive (i.e. the U.S. Canada Border Vision) to address the 
question: Why has joint policy development been outside the scope? Angles on this question, treated 
in several report-sections, will include structural differences in federal program development, 
intergovernmental dynamics, and the role of continuous evolution of cross-border mechanisms. 
Lastly the report will offer ideas for improving collaboration on development of shared long term 
strategy and programs that support those strategies. This section will cover program development, 
the relationships between federal and state and provincial governments, the role of binational border 
regions, and the possible improvement of mechanisms for binational investment and cooperation at 
the sub-national level. 
 
1.5. An important note on scope 
At the border, transportation, enforcement and security are intertwined. Because the primary focus 
of this paper is on improving the policy-making process, and transportation planning and 
programming is the chosen example for this research, the large amount of border-security and 
inspection-agency issues that would arise during any kind of actual program or project 
implementation are largely left to the side.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 3
Literature review 
The literature review undertaken here is first a survey of existing discussions of 1) how U.S. and 
Canadian federal government administration compare and contrast in program development and 
administration and 2) how similarities and differences affect the feasibility (or desirability) of 
collaboration at earlier stages of program development. Secondly, material was reviewed that 
included both assessments of past and current bilateral or North American cooperation as well as 
policy position papers from various sources on how the U.S. and Canada should proceed in the near 
future.  
Material considered for this project can be grouped in three categories: 1) basic descriptions of 
underlying government structure including comparisons of U.S. and Canadian policy-making 
institutions, 2) academic writings and government publications on North American integration, 
continentalism, government cooperation, etc. and 3) a mixture of academic, journalistic, and 
institutional policy position-papers related to advancing binational and trinational agendas. Lastly, 
the very recent declaration between President Obama and Prime Minister Harper is a key document 
for this project to consider. 
1.6. Descriptive texts on government structure 
An initial step was to review detailed descriptions of U.S. and Canadian government and legislative 
mechanics -- the determinants of our respective federal agency mechanics. These materials include 
thorough descriptions of each country’s different form of democracy (the presidential system versus 
the parliamentary system), Canadian Library of Parliament publications on Canadian Government 
structure (inclusive of chapters on comparison with U.S government), published Canadian debates 
on the U.S. congressional systems versus the British parliamentary system, detailed reviews of the 
Canadian federal budget process, and more. These materials (listed in the bibliography) inform an 
overview in the next section of the steps entailed in developing a federal program in the U.S. versus 
Canada. 
1.7. Academic and government-sponsored texts on governance & continentalism 
The next layer of literature to review was writings on existing forms of government-supported 
cooperation between the U.S. and Canada. Several institutional websites that maintain libraries and 
cross-listings of publications on these topics were very helpful. These include the Portal for North 
America, The North American Center for Transborder Studies, The Border Policy Research 
Institute, and the U.S.-Canada Transportation Border Working Group. While most of the academic 
literature in this area is under sub-categories like integration, continentalism, intergovernmental 
cooperation, and governance, there are, within this group, publications more specifically focused on 
themes relatable to this project’s federal-program orientation. While many papers are more focused 
on examining the prospects of NAFTA-based governance or comparing continental institutions, 
others focus, at least partially, on the implications of governmental structure on bilateral cooperation 
and integration. 
Clarkson and Banda in their 2004 paper on shifts in North American governance write from the 
perspectives of International Relations and Political Economy to first broadly discuss drivers of 
international policy alignment and determinants of whether two or more countries would want to, or 
would be able to, align their societal priorities—especially when one country, the United States, is 
disproportionally dominate in the continental relationship. In light of post 9/11 shifts by the U.S. 
Clarkson and Banda go on to suggest that the typical classification of governance regimes as either 
functionalist (organic alignment pursued within integrated sectors) or intergovernmental (deliberately 
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orchestrated alignments facilitated by government actors) are inadequate for describing the recent 
interactions between, or likely future for, NAFTA states. Intergovernmental governance, for 
example, would be that undertaken by European Union style institutions. But Clarkson and Banda’s 
assessment, articulated in these terms, is that the United States, after 9/11, shifted from a 
functionalist approach to NAFTA to a security-focused intergovernmental approach more focused 
on bilateral interactions than tri-national, North American continental governance. For the research 
being pursued here, it is interesting that Clarkson & Banda predict that a likely consequence of this 
shift will be that “economic pressure to maintain free flows of goods and people can be expected to 
generate integration incrementally as relatively small and technical issues are dealt with on an ad hoc 
basis.” (Clarkson & Banda, pg. 26) Indeed, a point of departure for this paper is that the U.S. & 
Canada and the U.S. & Mexico have pursued project-level [i.e. incremental] coordination in line with 
respective national policies but have not formulated longer-term approaches informed by structured 
review of shared objectives. 
Publications that focus more specifically on U.S.-Canada regulatory convergence include George 
Hoberg’s comparative work on U.S. and Canadian environmental governance. Hoberg gives a 
detailed assessment of how differences in policy-making institutions present challenges for 
binational cooperation. Differences between the United States’ “separation-of-powers” system and 
Canada’s parliamentary system are cited to illustrated the idea of legalism: legislative, congressional 
control of regulatory authority in the U.S. (which also plays out in relative involvement of each 
country’s judiciary in regulatory matters). A second dimension presented by Hoberg is 
fragmentation, which he uses to cite the relative centralization of each country’s federal government 
– a more powerful federal government in the U.S. and relatively more autonomous provincial 
governments in Canada. While these factors present challenges, Hoberg asserts (in a way that seems 
to accord with the motivations for this project) that “It would be too simplistic to state that they 
[institutional differences] are a force for divergence.” (pg. 355) 
Hoberg presents three categories of “forces for convergence:” international factors, economic 
globalization, and emulation. While all three are relevant to the discussion undertaken here, 
Hoberg’s citing of emulation (interactions which involve officials or policy specialists evaluating 
policy alternatives through participation in transnational policy communities—pg. 359) seems to 
characterize a lot of what has occurred in recent years between U.S and Canadian federal 
transportation agencies (including the Transportation Border Working Group). 
Kirton and Guebert, writing just last year (more than ten years after the above-cited work by 
Hoberg), review the relatively recent emergence of what they call summitry – periodic meetings 
between executives and high-level staff of the North American governments. Summitry, it’s argued, 
finds its effectiveness through “soft-law” mechanisms rather than “hard-law” instruments such as 
NAFTA. Kirton and Guebert cite four factors that they claim motivate the U.S. and Canada to 
pursue shared objectives through summitry and soft-law: legal, constitutional, and national values; 
increasing need of the United States to gain international cooperation on security strategies; political 
parameters of public opinion; and lastly, the process of incremental institutional “meshing”—
incremental, path-dependent successes in meeting basic needs. The last of these four is especially 
interesting to consider in light of cross-border, interagency activities over the last ten or fifteen years. 
One paper that bridges the more academic articles and the policy-position papers of chambers of 
commerce and industry associations (discussed more below) is Kirton and Richardson’s paper 
(published by the Canadian Policy Research Institute) reviewing the Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation (CEC) as a lesson for Canada-U.S. regulatory cooperation. 
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The authors introduce the work as a study of Canada-U.S. regulatory cooperation and the CEC a 
possible model for broader regulatory cooperation. The report documents important differences as 
well as similarities to what already exists in the transportation sector in the form of the US-Canada 
TBWG. The CEC’s existence and structure is defined in an international companion agreement to 
NAFTA (the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation – NAAEC). It is 
approved by our respective legislatures and comes with proscribed authorities. Despite this, the 
CEC, as depicted in this report, finds much of its effectiveness in coordination and communication 
similar to that conducted less formally through the TBWG. 
One summary comment in the report states, “The CEC has produced useful deliverables. In general, 
it is best suited to doing so on relatively specific agendas.” (pg. 20) In many ways, it seems that the 
CEC’s lack of “access” to a longer-view discussion about alignment of strategic goals and strategies 
is similar to the gaps that this research is identifying and responding to. 
1.8. Policy papers of industry & government 
Perhaps starting with the U.S.-Canada Accord on our Shared Border (the Shared Border Accord), 
our two countries’ administrations have periodically developed and issued detailed policy statements 
covering an array of cross-border and sector-specific initiatives relative to various binational agenda 
(the Accord, the Canada U.S. Partnership, Smart Border Declaration, Security Prosperity 
Partnership). President Obama and Prime Minister Harper have issued the most recent declaration 
at the time of this writing: Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic 
Competitiveness. 
Along with the established pattern of periodic executive declarations between U.S. and Canadian 
(and sometimes Mexican) administrations, industry associations, chambers of commerce, and other 
non-governmental and policy-advocacy institutions have over the last few years issued several 
assessments and lists of recommendations for how the U.S. and Canada can better align regulations 
and support relative to shared objectives. Examples of these documents include The Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce’s December 2010 report, Strengthening Our Ties: Four Steps Toward a More 
Successful Canada-U.S. Partnership; NACTS’s 2009 report, North America Next: A Report to President 
Obama on Building Sustainable Security and Competitiveness; Carelton University’s Canada-U.S. Project’s 
2009 report: From Correct to Inspired: A Blueprint for Canada-US Engagement; and The Canadian 
International Council’s (CIC) 2008 report, A New Bridge for Old Allies. These reports, collectively and 
individually, identify goals, challenges, and strategies that both illustrate a constituency for border-
facilitation and substantiate many of the perceived gaps that motivate this research project.  
The reports reference the challenges presented by the mechanical differences between our forms of 
democracy (e.x. the Carelton University report notes that “the unique separation of powers in 
America inevitably trumps notions of party loyalty…” pg. 13). 
The reports note that most U.S.-Canada cooperation has been in response to specific issues as they 
arise and that such a pattern of ad hoc cooperation will not support the level of collaboration 
required by current shared objectives. On this point, the Carelton report states that the U.S. and 
Canada are faced with a dearth of [shared] institutions at the highest levels of government capable of 
engaging political leaders (Carelton University, pg. 14). 
The CIC report is noteworthy for 1) its recommendations regarding transportation planning which 
includes themes I echo in this research and 2) the many details which seem to have been absorbed 
into the recent Harper-Obama declaration. Under its section on a “shared border and transportation 
strategy,” the CIC report recommends that “In order to maximize the benefits for the North 
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American economy and to strengthen the Regional Secure Space, a Joint Transportation Strategy 
should be established, so that future transportation planning involving our common border can be 
undertaken at the same time by policy makers in both countries.” (pg. 6) While this is very much 
part of the what this research is about, the CIC report illustrates the potential value of this endeavor 
primarily by citing specific systems (port operations, regulatory changes, etc.). More along the lines 
of the institutional changes that would be needed to develop and work within a new Joint 
Transportation Strategy, the CIC report recommends establishing “a standing Canada-US 
Transportation Planning Group staffed by officials from Transport Canada and the US Department 
of Transportation and supplemented by representatives from province/state transportation 
departments to promote synergies between intended transportation investments on both sides of the 
border.” To the extent that such a committee has existed since 2001 in the form the U.S.-Canada 
Transportation Border Working Group (TBWG), these good suggestions support the need to 
explore further how these goals and actions can be built on and used to sustain ongoing, 
programmatic strategy development and planning-coordination for cross-border transportation. 
1.9. Very recent writings saved for later discussion 
The February 2011 Beyond the Border Declaration (issued by the Canadian and U.S. governments), 
as well as a paper examining the declaration (The Canada Gambit by Chris Sands) were reviewed for 
this research. Since these two pieces are so directly pertinent, all discussion of them will be handled 
in later sections. 
 
Building blocks of symmetrical federal programs 
This section will review the determinants most likely to influence the pursuit of the theoretical 
action considered in this paper: improving our institutional ability to jointly plan and administer 
complementary federal programs and specifically, programs that focus on our shared cross-border 
transportation systems. As important context, Section 4 will briefly review challenges to 
administering border related programs whether such programs are bilateral or not. 
1.10. Government structure 
As is often and appropriately noted at the beginning of a diplomatic statement by a U.S. or Canadian 
official commenting on cross-border interaction, our countries enjoy the daily benefits of 
commonality to a much larger degree than we are encumbered by differences. Nevertheless, in 
preparing to navigate a path towards improved bilateral coordination, there are meaningful 
differences to appreciate in the structures of our federal governments that shape the opportunities. 
The representative democracies of the United States and Canadian governments1, a presidential system 
and a parliamentary system respectively, while comprised of a similar federal-government 
components and legal conventions, operate under significantly different distributions of legislative 
and executive authorities and resulting sequences of legislation and administrative execution. The 
preceding section’s discussion of proposed binational commissions, much like initiatives tried under 
past binational declarations, begins to illustrate how the presidential-parliamentary mismatch should 
																																																								
1 Distinguishing here between governments and countries – as a country, Canada is a constitutional 
monarchy with the King or Queen of England as the head of state while the Canadian prime minister is the 
head of the government. The U.S. president can be considered head of state and head of the government. 
(Forsey, pg. 25) 
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inform current and future approaches to longer-term cooperative strategy. In Canada, since the 
prime minister and ministers in charge of federal agencies are selected from the majority party (or 
coalition) in the legislature (the House of Commons), the executive and legislative branches are, by 
definition, in accord respecting policies that advance from the government. In the United States, 
because the president is separately and directly elected and remains a separate actor from the 
legislature, issuance of a joint declaration with the prime minster of Canada for example, cannot be 
assumed to have the support of the U.S. Congress. The practical result is that, despite a lot of careful 
thought and energy of political leaders of both countries, periodic declarations by both countries’ 
executive branches cannot be assumed to have support of the U.S. legislature. And, definitive, 
legislative support is often needed. U.S. administrative agencies can only spend money (conduct 
actions) on things that are authorized in law. So, while a declaration might proclaim a shared interest 
in change, proposed changes might still require new corresponding legislation. 
1.10.1. Comparing the origins of federal agency action 
To carry out their obligations and policies, governments create programs and agencies. Because U.S. 
and Canadian government structures (discussed above) apply different parameters and sequences to 
this process, a general comparison of the path from program conception to execution is useful. 
The federal budgets. A good place to start is a comparison of the U.S. and the Canadian federal 
budget. In Canada, the federal budget is the document that declares what the government will do. It’s 
not law in and of itself, but the Government, after a thorough process of consultations with 
government departments, financial forecasters, and parliamentary committees, introduces the budget 
to parliament for approval. (Disapproval of the budget is a no-confidence vote and initiates selection 
of a new government.) After political approval, Parliament approves the budget in law with an 
implementation act and funds the budget with appropriations acts. 
The U.S. federal budget is, by comparison, more simply a proposal from the President based on the 
administration’s (the executive branch’s) priorities. While it is also the product of numerous inputs 
from agencies, committees, and financial forecasts, the programs that the budget proposes to 
continue or initiate depend on a mixture of existing authority (for existing programs) and new 
legislation (for new programs) from a cooperative legislature. As a good example of a resulting 
difference between the U.S. presidential system and the Canadian parliamentary system, the success 
the President can expect in advancing priorities through the budget is largely dependent on the 
degree of political alignment with the current Congress. 
Authorizations. As noted above once a new program is approved in the Canadian budget, its 
legislative authorization by Parliament is essentially procedural. In the United States, authorizing-
legislation is not only a required next step in response to a budget proposal, it is an independent 
process of Congress through which the legislative branch can initiate or terminate government 
programs—either in cooperation with the President or not. 
Appropriations. In both countries, for an authorized federal program to receive funds, the 
legislature must appropriate funds in law. In Canada, like the budget implementation acts 
(authorization), appropriation acts are almost assured following parliamentary budget approval. 
In the United States, the basic fiscal sequence is the same but passage of appropriations acts is a 
more separate step (institutionally, temporally, and often politically) and continues the policy 
negotiations between the Administration and the Legislature, between legislators from different 
parties and regions, and among special interests. It’s also important to realize that U.S. 
appropriations bills have evolved to become an opportunity for legislators to insert language 
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directing that specific projects receive specific amounts of funding—commonly referred to as 
earmarks (recently a topic of much debate in the U.S.). A result is that each step is then another 
opportunity for significant revision. 
Execution. At the end of the cycle, a government agency (for the purposes of example in this 
paper, Transport Canada or the U.S. Federal Highways Administration) is authorized and funded to 
carry out a program. From the perspective of this research--evaluating the ongoing implications for 
binational programmatic coordination—two things can be pointed out here. 
1) Execution of a program by a federal department often requires rule making at the outset—
writing regulations. This is obviously a critical area for any binational initiative. 
2) The coordination of program execution, and in some cases the improved alignment of 
agency-level regulations is the arena that the United States and Canada have been working in. 
For a longer term, more strategic, programmatic approach to border-facilitation to develop, 
it is likely necessary to pursue more parallel development of complementary program 
elements earlier in the cycle outlined above. 
 
1.11. Comparing existing U.S. and Canadian national border programs 
The U.S. and Canada have adopted compatible views of our shared border. While not intended to 
complement each other, our countries have developed similar investment programs in support of 
cross-border trade and travel. This existing context is another building block. This section presents 
two comparisons of these programs—one to examine the components of the programs and another 
to examine how the two programs were established within their respective government processes. 
The purposes of this section are to 1) show that the U.S. and Canada already approach similar issues 
with similar strategies and tactics, 2) provide a reference for identifying alignment opportunities in 
the program development stage, and 3) exemplify a perspective that could better facilitate future 
discussions of coordinated program design. 
 
1.11.1. The U.S. Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program (CBI) and the Canadian 
Gateways and Border Crossings Fund (GBCF) – STRUCTURE  
 
 Canada’s Gateways & Border 
Crossings Fund 
US Coordinated Border 
Infrastructure Program 
Year started 2007 2005 
Length of 
Program 
7 years 5 years (has been extended under 
continuing resolutions) 
Total 
funding 
$2.1 billion (CAD) $833 million (USD) 
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 Canada’s Gateways & Border 
Crossings Fund 
(continued) 
US Coordinated Border 
Infrastructure Program (continued) 
Purpose The Gateways & Border Crossings 
Fund is advanced under, and in 
alignment with, the broader National a 
Framework [NPF] for Strategic Gateways 
and Trade Corridors, a “…long-term 
policy, planning and strategic 
investment in transportation systems to 
strengthen Canada’s position in 
international commerce”  which “…will 
support specific strategies to seize 
geographic, trade and transportation 
opportunities in key regions.” The 
Gateways and Border Crossings Fund, 
specifically, will “enhance Canada’s 
trade competitiveness and the efficiency 
of the national transportation system. 
This fund helps support infrastructure 
improvements at and leading to key 
locations, such as major border 
crossings between Canada and the U.S. 
It also advances multimodal and 
technology initiatives that improve 
system integration.” (NPF pg 14) 
…to improve the safe movement of 
motor vehicles at or across the border 
between the United States and Canada 
and the border between the United 
States and Mexico. 
Funding 
allocation 
decision 
process 
Strategies and investments are based on 
subsequent analysis with regard to the 
NPF’s five policy lenses. (NPF pg. 5) 
Specific funding amounts are awarded 
on a merit basis. (NPF pg. 14) 
Funds distributed by formula to border 
states who decide investments based on 
eligible-use and geographic criteria. 
Eligible uses  Core National Highway System 
(NHS) facilities impacted by 
increased trade flows, 
  Inter-modal connectors and 
facilities, 
  International bridges and tunnels, 
  Rail/road grade separations, 
  Short-line rail,  
  Short-sea shipping, and 
  Intelligent transportation systems. 
 Improvements to existing 
transportation and supporting 
infrastructure 
 Construction of highways and related 
safety and safety enforcement facilities 
related to international trade 
 Operational improvements, including 
electronic data interchange and use of 
telecommunications 
 Modifications to regulatory 
procedures 
 International coordination of 
transportation planning, 
programming, and border operation 
with Canada and Mexico. 
	 10
 Canada’s Gateways & Border 
Crossings Fund 
(continued) 
US Coordinated Border 
Infrastructure Program (continued) 
Financial 
requirements 
Federal funding is negotiated with 
provinces through a participation 
agreement which establishes match 
requirements and other  
20 percent non-federal match required. 
Information 
sources 
National Policy Framework for Strategic 
Gateways and Trade Corridors   
SAFETEA-LU (Safe Accountable 
Flexible Efficient Transportation Equity 
Act: A Legacy for Users) Section 1303 
 
Observations on program structure: Breaking down and comparing programs in terms of 
commonly labeled dimensions helps illustrate some of the details that more symmetrical programs 
could incorporate as well as those that are probably less important. Timelines could match better 
which could improve the likelihood of each country being better positioned to pursue collaborative 
projects. Funding amount, is important but, unless the amounts are so different to render 
coordination pointless, other aspects of programmatic symmetry are likely much more critical to 
success. 
The stated purposes of the two programs compared here – again, not that these programs were 
intended to complement each other—are not as dissimilar as they are unbalanced. First, the U.S. 
program also covers borders with Mexico. Second, the Canadian Gateways & Border Fund is 
directed at multiple policy objectives. So, the implication of this dimension is that finding ground for 
symmetry will require focus 
The funding allocation dimension gives some insight into Hoberg’s discussion of fragmentation 
(discussed above) – the funding distribution mechanisms being much more institutionalized between 
U.S. states and the U.S. federal government. But there is no clear reason differences along this 
dimension would be a barrier to programmatic symmetry. 
The eligible use lists are typical. A comparison of them sheds a little light on the program objectives 
that would need to be narrowed or aligned to affect better symmetry (ex. highway focus vs. 
multimodal, infrastructure, planning, information technology). Eligible uses may also be a function 
of the administering agencies involved and what they are authorized to be involved in. 
Financial requirements are not likely an essential dimension with regard to program symmetry but 
could be a source of benefit if designed to be complimentary. Eligible sources match, eligible 
recipients, amount of time recipients have to use funds are examples of financial dimensions that 
would affect how well two programs could be coordinated towards shared objectives. 
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1.11.2. The U.S. Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program (CBI) and the Canadian 
Gateways and Border Crossings Fund (GBCF) – PROGRAM 
DEVELOPMENT 
This section will review and discuss the basic steps conducted to design and implement the U.S. CBI 
program and the Canadian GBCF program. Again, the objective is to provide a chronology that will 
help identify opportunities for coordination earlier the program-development cycle. 
 Canada’s Gateways & Border 
Crossings Fund 
US Coordinated Border 
Infrastructure Program 
First 
documented 
proposal. 
Program proposed from within 
Transport Canada to be a component 
of the Strategic Gateways and trade 
Corridors program. 
Proposed in draft reauthorization 
legislation – either by Congress or the 
Administration. 
Internal review 
and approval for 
advancement 
Proposal to Minister’s office – 
Approval by Minister. 
Review for incorporation into draft 
legislation by House and/or Senate 
subcommittees. 
Review for 
inclusion in 
authorization 
bill. 
Review for inclusion in next year’s 
federal budget. 
Review of how program fits into 
context of specific authorization bill. 
Passage of 
authorization 
act. 
Budget approved and corresponding 
authorization bill passed. 
House of Representatives passage. 
Senate passage 
Conference committee administrative 
revisions 
Presidential signature 
 
Observations on program development: The steps identified and described in the above table are 
truncated and generalized but is hopefully sufficient to identify questions about possible program-
design strategies. 
Comparing CBI’s and GBCF’s first documented proposal (some record of both the impetus and the 
proposed programmatic response) one of the first observations is that collaboration would need to 
start before this – with a decision to work together to develop this proposal for parallel, 
complementary programs. If the acknowledged intent were to seek legislative authorization for a 
new program, would the work required to develop the proposal require its own approval 
The transition to and completion of the next two steps, internal review and inclusion in an 
authorization bill, illustrates a process difference between the United States and Canada. In the U.S. 
these next phases involve review by legislative committees and inclusion in a bill. In Canada, the 
process remains under the purview of the government (the administration) until the largely 
procedural legislative action of authorizing the government’s budget. Because of the large amount of 
changes that are typically made to draft legislation and budgets by legislators and committees (in 
both countries) the theoretical example being considered here, deliberate parallel development of 
symmetrical investment programs, would likely be challenged by the simple difficulty of maintaining 
control over the details. Before undertaking an effort like this, it would be critical to have a pre-
arranged mechanism for monitoring and consultation throughout the process. 
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1.1. Existing efforts – The Transport Canada – U.S. Department of Transportation 
MoU and the TBWG 
Towards the goal of coordinating various cross-border transportation initiatives, the United States 
and Canada developed and signed a Memorandum of Understanding in October 2000. Both the 
MOU and the resulting formation of the TBWG are additional building blocks—additional 
institutional capacity—that could be drawn on to support and foster development of symmetrical 
planning and investment programs. 
This section will review the October 2000 MOU and the TBWG’s role in advancing the MoU’s 
goals. The initial section of the MoU, the stated motives (the “whereases”) will be listed and 
discussed. Next, to provide some context for a review of TBWG-actions relative to the MoU’s 
stated intentions, basic features of the TBWG will be reviewed. Lastly, the MoU’s listed intentions 
will be used to structure a review of TBWG activity. 
1.1.1. High level objectives of the MoU (MoU part 1 of 2) 
 
WHEREAS 1 
WHEREAS the Department of Transportation of the United States of America and 
Transport Canada desire to enhance collaboration on transportation matters of mutual interest 
including: The need to 
ASSESSMENT Clarifies parties to the MOU and topic of transportation. 
 
WHEREAS 1B 
Develop a common border/corridor strategy and for better coordination between the United 
States and Canada; 
ASSESSMENT This research paper largely picks up on this idea. 
 
WHEREAS 1C Cooperate on developing and implementing national polices on intermodalism; and 
ASSESSMENT Careful language that steers clear of binational policies or institutions but, nonetheless, puts a very ambitious goal on the table. 
 
WHEREAS 1D 
The need for more frequent high-level communication between Transport Canada and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation; 
ASSESSMENT Interesting to remember that not much of this was happening before 2000. 
 
WHEREAS 2 
AND WHEREAS the U.S. Department of Transportation and Transport Canada 
recognize that the significantly increased trade flows and passenger flows between the United 
States and Canada are exerting pressure on our shared land border and that the resulting border 
delays have a negative impact on the logistics supply chain and the economy; 
ASSESSMENT The shared motivation: trade, supply-chain logistics, and the economy. Pre 9/11 so security not yet as prominent. 
WHEREAS 3 
AND WHEREAS establishment of common data elements, data identification, collection, 
and analysis is of paramount importance in understanding, planning and deployment of 
interoperable transportation systems of the future; 
ASSESSMENT Acknowledgement of the importance of information based on mutually validated data. 
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WHEREAS 4 
AND WHEREAS transportation research and development, including intelligent 
transportation systems (ITS), is a high priority for both the U.S. Department of Transportation 
and Transport Canada. 
ASSESSMENT Expectation of cooperation’s value to research, development, and application of information systems. 
1.1.2. TBWG basics 
Administered jointly by FHWA and TC, and meeting semiannually in alternate U.S. and Canadian 
locations usually near the border itself, the U.S.-Canada Transportation Border Working Group 
(TBWG) formed a mission statement (based on the MoU), an action plan (available at 
www.thetbwg.org), and a subcommittee structure to support the action plan. 
Most directly connected to the seventh goal of the MoU (listed below), “Meeting more regularly to 
conduct information exchanges and discuss issues of mutual concern,” the initiation of the TBWG 
included an additional element that is critical to note here – the inclusion of U.S. states and Canadian 
provinces. While this added a layer of sub-national government agency participation, it was an 
essential step in setting up a collaborative framework that accurately reflected the primary role states 
and provinces have in identifying, prioritizing, and funding transportation system investments and 
maintenance that, together with federally controlled ports-of-entry, support cross-border movement 
of trade and travel. 
Additionally, while federal inspection agencies were invited to participate in TBWG from the 
beginning, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, U.S. and Canadian border inspection agencies 
were more formally asked to join Transport Canada and U.S. Federal Highway Administration as co-
chairs of the working group (This never really took hold as intended). 
In recent years, TBWG has regularly included more private sector representatives most notably 
industry associations representing bridge and tunnel operators (many important border crossings 
include privately owned bridges and tunnels) and industry associations like national trucking 
associations and manufacturers. 
For more information on the TBWG organization, membership, mission statement, action plan, and 
activities, please see www.thetbwg.org 
1.1.3. The MoU resolutions & TBWG (MoU part 2 of 2) 
Following the above section on the basics of TBWG, The “resolution” section of the MoU 
(included with annotations below) can be used more appropriately as a checklist to review TBWG 
activities as they have related to the MoU.  
Note: In order to facilitate the review of MoU intentions with respect to TBWG, Intention VII, 
which speaks most directly forming a working group, is moved to the top of the list. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Introduction: The Department of Transportation of the United States of America and 
Transport Canada intend to enhance collaboration and cooperation on: 
ASSESSMENT 
The memorandum’s “resolutions” are listed as intentions – a good way to move 
forward with documenting shared goals without invoking the weight and 
possible inertia of more binding or enforceable mechanisms. 
TBWG has indeed enhanced collaboration and cooperation – details below. 
 
INTENTION 
VII 
Meeting more regularly to conduct information exchanges and discuss issues of mutual concern. 
ASSESSMENT 
Lead by Transport Canada and U.S. Federal Highway Administration, TBWG was 
set up in 2000 and has met two times per year since then. TBWG has also been 
the principal or joint sponsor of numerous multi-stakeholder sub-committee 
meetings and U.S.-Canada transportation forums. 
 
INTENTION I Corridor/border projects and new programs of mutual interest; 
ASSESSMENT 
Many TBWG participants (ex. state and provincial transportation agency 
managers) have noted the numerous ways that the professional networks, 
information-exchange regarding current planning and infrastructure projects, and 
enhanced mutual appreciation for each other’s planning and financing regulations 
have improved the process and quality of their respective border-related projects. 
While TBWG has established an Action Plan and subcommittees to help advance 
it (detailed more below), a specific approach to developing “new programs” has 
not been undertaken in the context of TBWG. Depending on how the MoU is 
interpreted on this point, the question posed in this paper is, if the U.S. and 
Canada (via TBWG or otherwise) wanted to advance coordinated border program 
development, how would it be best to pursue that? 
 
INTENTION II 
Mapping freight flows, collecting data and identifying data gaps that need to be filled to help 
identify pressure points on the transportation and intermodal freight system in North America; 
ASSESSMENT 
Early on, the TBWG established collaborative improvement of trade and traffic 
data as a specific initiative, placed it on the action plan, and formed a sub-
committee to advance goals more directly. Benefiting from this level of attention 
and increased knowledge of various data sources, individual agency offices (like 
U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics and Statistics Canada have continued 
collaboration with each other as well as pursued separate efforts to improve 
complementary data and information with federal border inspection and 
international trade agencies. 
The US FHWA Freight office has produced freight-flow maps (based on 
commodity flow survey data) and Industry Canada has pursued “value-chain 
mapping” studies. These have been independently pursued but both cognizant of 
cross-border routes. 
Transport Canada conducted a 2006 National Roadside Survey which collected 
more direct data on a large sample of cross-border freight. 
Lastly, the TBWG data subcommittee also commissioned a data gaps analysis 
titled Developing a Framework for Collecting and Sharing Data and Information. 
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INTENTION 
III 
The development of an ITS architecture for North America which includes common data 
elements and a common border architecture, intermodal freight architecture, and commercial 
vehicle architecture; and the use of this architecture to guide deployment of interoperable strategic 
ITS applications along the border; 
ASSESSMENT 
Very much related to intention IV (below), Transport Canada and FHWA have has 
effectively used TBWG as the venue to develop and refine the Border 
Information Flow Architecture (BIFA) – a regional ITS architecture designed to 
serve as a template for coordinating information technology applications and 
interdependencies in a cross-border region. 
 
INTENTION IV 
The development of North American standards for intelligent transportation systems which focus 
on priorities of mutual interest and avoid duplicative efforts; 
ASSESSMENT 
There have been notable initiatives that fall into this category. The ongoing work 
of the Border Wait-time working group fits this description. In many ways, earlier 
and continuing work by the U.S. Federal Motor Carriers Administration with 
counterpart CCMTA in Canada advances goals of regulatory and operational 
alignment on issues of commercial vehicle safety. 
These specific operational issues are good examples of the level of detail that the 
TBWG is equipped to discuss. 
 
INTENTION V 
Development of uniform approaches to expedited processing of commercial vehicles through border 
crossings, while satisfying the requirements of all governmental jurisdictions; federal, state and 
provincial; 
ASSESSMENT 
This intention illustrates the level of interest, pre-9/11, in applying IT to border 
crossing efficiency. Post 9/11 (shortly after the signing of this MoU), this type of 
initiative took on a primary security focus and was spearheaded by inspection 
agencies rather than transportation agencies. The most obvious initiative that 
would fit under this category (but not an obvious result of this MoU) is the U.S. 
and Canada’s joint roll-out of trusted-trader programs as initiatives of the Smart 
Border Declaration and under the banner of FAST. 
The topic of joint-approaches to optimizing cross-border freight flow has 
remained central at TBWG and has included how federal, state, and provincial 
jurisdictions can best collaborate with operation of national programs such as 
FAST or border wait-time measurement and dissemination. 
This is the only place in the MoU where the importance of multiple governmental 
jurisdictions is noted. As evidenced by the TBWG’s composition, this level of 
involvement has been accomplished. 
 
INTENTION VI 
Increasing the degree and speed of communication between the two departments to ensure that 
each is kept apprised of developments and initiatives in the other country; 
ASSESSMENT 
Semi annual meetings of TBWG since 2000, the resulting network of government 
agency professionals and shared knowledge of each other’s roles and 
responsibilities, follows through on this intention very well. 
Signed in Washington, DC, on this 13th day of October 2000. 
For the Department of Transportation of the United States of America: Rodney E. Slater 
For Transport Canada: David M. Collenette 
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1.1.4. The MoU – what we have established and what remains to be initiated 
The U.S. and Canada, via TBWG and other parallel actions, have brought federal agencies together, 
along with state, provincial, and private sector representatives to create new and important 
networks, trust-based relationships, and institutional capacity to collaborate and partner on several 
distinct topics. These include trade and travel data and information collection and sharing, ITS 
planning standards, adding more coordinated and focused federal support to individual cross-border 
projects (such as new ports of entry), and repeatedly convened multi-stakeholder participation in 
new initiatives (i.e. border wait-time evaluations, border infrastructure financing, regional border 
planning). 
Aspects of the MoU that have not advanced, looking specifically at the “intentions,” include 
collaboration on development of new programs (part of Intention I) and a cooperative assessment 
of the transportation and intermodal freight system of North America (part of Intention II). 
Looking at the MoU’s motivations (the “whereases”) it could be inferred that the signatories saw 
even more potential than they were ready to label as “intentions.” These include development of a 
common border/corridor strategy, cooperative development of national policies, and planning and 
development of interoperable transportation systems. 
A theoretical objective that would fit well within the scope of these remaining components of the 
MoU could be cooperative development of new programs, based on shared national strategies, for 
ongoing coordinated investment in cross-border transportation. The final section of this paper will 
consider strategies for advancing that objective. Before that, the next two sections will review 
broader contextual issues that affect bilateral coordination on borders. 
2. General challenges  
Focusing coordinated attention on the border and border-related issues is challenging enough in the 
domestic policy environment. While it is the challenge of advancing solutions between neighboring 
countries that motivates this paper, some issues are likely to persist even if identified strategies 
worked wonderfully 
2.1. Government timelines 
Even if our governments were identically structured, it is likely that election cycles (both executive 
and legislative), fiscal cycles, and related program duration would be different. But many of these 
schedules are known and could be accounted for if crafting complementary cross-border strategies. 
2.2. Operational intersection of transportation and inspection 
The challenges of improving the alignment of planning timelines, investment prioritization, and 
overall communication between federal transportation agencies and federal border inspection 
agencies is an ongoing challenge that will likely be dealt with similarly with or without improved 
policy and program coordination.  
2.3. Politics and policy agendas 
For many reasons, efforts towards international coordination and partnership often raise specific 
citizen concerns about sovereignty, diversion of resources from domestic issues, association with 
unrelated policies of the other country, etc. Similarly, high profile domestic policy debates (ex. U.S. 
healthcare reform) can absorb sufficient amounts of a government’s attention to render other 
initiatives dormant. Such machinations will always be part of the landscape, and, along with the 
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structural implications of election cycles and fiscal calendars, only underscores the need for bilateral 
mechanisms that can sustain the ebb and flow of opportunity (and be able to position new successes 
as best practice). 
3. Updating the context: The February 2011 Beyond the Border Vision (BBV) – declaration 
by President Obama and Prime Minister Harper 
Somewhat concurrent with the initiation of this project, the context for the discussion was 
augmented by the signing on February 4, 2011 of Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter 
Security and Economic Competitiveness. A Declaration by the President of the United States of America and the 
Prime Minister of Canada. 
In many ways, the BBV can be seen as the latest in a series of executive-level declarations focused 
on improving U.S.-Canada bilateral undertakings and giving the listed objectives added push. 
Previous declarations in this category include the Security Prosperity Partnership (SPP), the Smart 
Border Declaration (SBD), the Canada-U.S Partnership (CUSP), and the Shared Border Accord 
(SBA). While a full review of the BBV is beyond the scope of this paper, specific components are 
very relevant to this examination of how our two countries might pursue collaborative program 
development. 
3.1.1. Selected BBV citations 
As evidence for how the BBV may provide policy direction and support for proactive joint program 
development, the following selections are listed below. 
Citation 1 “We intend to work together…to fulfill our vision.” 
Observation: As an opening principle, and much like the preamble of preceding declarations, 
cooperation on a vision is the essence of planning 
Citation 2 “We rely on... transportation networks…” 
Observation: Confirms interest in transportation and shared notion of a network. 
Citation 3 
“We intend to pursue creative and effective solutions to manage the flow of traffic between the 
United States and Canada. We will focus investment in modern infrastructure and technology at 
our busiest land ports of entry...” 
Observation: While this goal could be pursued via well-intended unilateral investment programs, 
the desired creativity and effectiveness would be maximized if coordination is pursued prior to the 
project development phase. 
Citation 4 
“…we intend to continue planning together, organizing bi-national port of entry committees to 
coordinate planning and funding, building, expanding or modernizing shared border 
management facilities and border infrastructure where appropriate...” 
Observation: While examples of the above-listed activities exist and provide evidence for the 
feasibility and effectiveness of such approaches, the success of these initiatives as shared national 
strategies would be well served by coordinated programmatic support. 
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Citation 5 “We intend to look for opportunities to integrate our efforts and where practicable, to work together to develop joint facilities and programs.” 
Observation: It is fair to say that true “integration of efforts” has been an infrequent outcome. A 
notable example is the NEXUS trusted traveler program. But the term’s use in the BBV presumably 
signals an interest in adding more examples. 
The intention to “look for opportunities” signals that the BBV is not only intended to proscribe but 
to invite innovation. 
And, this section also makes a direct reference to joint program development. The context around 
this citation may be more related to operational programs (like NEXUS and FAST), and equally tied 
to security as to transportation and trade investment. But the acknowledged expected benefit from 
joint programs and resulting questions about how our countries would pursue joint program 
development, are very well placed and well timed for the questions raised in this paper. 
Citation 6 “We intend to work towards developing an integrated cargo security strategy...” 
Observation: This is a direct example of the BBV acknowledging the appropriateness of our two 
countries jointly developing a strategy – a plan to inform subsequent program development, funding 
decisions, operations, and projects. 
Citation 7 
“The United States and Canada intend to establish a Beyond the Border Working Group 
(BBWG) composed of representatives from the appropriate departments and offices of our 
respective federal governments.” 
“Responsibility for ensuring inter-agency coordination will rest with the President and the Prime 
Minister and their respective officials.” 
“The BBWG will report on the implementation of this declaration to Leaders on an annual 
basis. The mandate of the BBWG will be reviewed after three years.”  
Observation: This is the point where we are left to wait and see what the actual mechanisms for 
implementation of the BBV goals will be. If through the BBWG, BBV initiatives are simply 
delegated to federal agencies, it is not reasonable to expect outcomes different from those following 
prior declarations. If, as the sentence on executive-level responsibility alludes, there is “higher-level” 
involvement, there will likely be a better chance of more functional interagency-cooperation (as 
much a domestic issue as a binational one), and perhaps a willingness to explore complementary and 
coordinated legislative involvement. 
Resulting strategy for advancing coordinated policy and programming 
Drawing on the issues and topics reviewed above, this section will identify components of a strategy 
that the United States and Canada could pursue to advance the coordinated development of 
complementary border-planning programs. 
3.2. The landscape has continued to evolve 
In the 16 years since enactment of the NAFTA, the previously discussed declarations and binational 
working-group activities have resulted in numerous incremental improvements. Various actions have 
not only addressed specific persistent stumbling blocks (cost-sharing, data-sharing, system 
evaluation) but have also resulted in much improved cross-border institutional connections. 
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3.2.1. Contemporary capacity for cross-border intergovernmental collaboration 
according to the literature 
Going back to the literature reviewed in Section 2, this updated sense of institutional capacity can be 
viewed in terms of what Clarkson & Banda saw as in incremental integration focused mostly on 
technical issues. While the actors are primarily government agencies, the governments have not 
formed new institutions (such as those of the European Union) to pursue shared goals, falling well 
short of a much less organic, intergovernmental approach articulated by Clarkson & Banda. 
Kirton and Guebert in their description of interagency cooperation between the United States and 
Canada use the term institutional meshing – a process of small successes leading to more significant 
solutions. Also supporting the perspective that these successes are additive and validate deepening 
collaboration, Hoberg put forth the concept of emulation as a force for ongoing binational 
convergence. 
The TBWG provides examples of technical successes most pertinent to this paper’s focus on 
border-transportation. While many of the items listed below may seem routine when viewed in a 
domestic context, they were only achieved in the binational, interagency context through creativity, 
persistence, and commitment to expected value by decision-makers. 
 Development and maintenance of an action plan. 
 Creation of a joint website (thetbwg.org) 
 Completion of an information-technology (ITS) architecture for cross-border operational 
environments. 
 Establishment of a binational, interagency working group between U.S. FHWA, Transport 
Canada, CBSA, and U.S. CBP to work on development and application of automated border 
wait-time systems. 
 Conclusions of a cost-sharing agreement for transfer of funds between U.S. and Canadian 
federal agencies. 
 Conclusion of a cross-border interagency ITS project work plan (for the joint, border wait-
time project). 
As seen through the lens of the literature reviewed above, the incremental successes of the TBWG 
illustrate gradual and important increases, not in new institutions themselves, but in institutional 
capacity between and among existing federal agencies. This would seem to support an interpretation 
that the prospects for a next step – like the more deeply coordinated programmatic approach to 
border investment planning envisioned by this paper – is a more feasible prospect than it has been 
in previous years. 
3.2.2. One response to the Beyond the Border Vision 
As alluded to in the literature review, a very timely writing by Christopher Sands was published in 
the month after the BBV declaration – The Canada Gambit: Will it Revive North America? Sands’ paper, 
while covering several broader questions, is primarily a review of the Beyond the Border Vision 
declaration (and the companion joint statement on regulatory cooperation) and provides important 
perspectives on the resulting prospects for new types of collaboration on border investment and 
management. 
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Sands also notes the likely insufficiency of the BBWG alone to make meaningful progress under the 
BBV stating, “Rather than learning from these past experiences, in taking the Canada Gambit route 
to North American governance negotiations the United States and Canada have embarked upon two 
new processes that rely mainly on civil service initiative and risk-taking in order to generate progress 
and potential gains.” (Sands pg. 25) In continuing with this point in terms of a forgone alternative, 
Sands writes, “Like the Bush administration, the Obama administration appears to be intent on 
restricting talks with Canada to areas within the statutory authority of administrative departments 
and agencies so that it is not necessary to seek prior congressional approval for negotiations.” 
(Sands, pg. 28). And, in further articulating rather low expectations for the BBV process as it stands, 
Sands says, “There is no mechanism or incentive in the Washington Declarations that would justify 
higher expectations.” 
In addition to explaining reasons why the U.S. and Canada need progress on bilateral initiatives, 
Sands, like this paper seeks to do, submits reasons why past initiatives (and likely the BBV, too) have 
fallen short. Much of this boils down to politics: political will, the inherent turnover in representative 
democracy, competing domestic and other international issues, etc. Making this assessment, Sands 
states, “The two leaders have invested a limited amount of political capital in these declarations, and 
have delegated the responsibility for action and oversight to two committees of federal officials.” 
(pg. 24) 
The last of Sands’ many points especially useful for this paper is his acknowledgement that the 
BBWG (at least as described in the BBV declaration) “does not include state or local 
governments…” (pg. 20) 
Three incremental advances come to mind that address some of the deficits Sands identifies. First, 
since its formation in 2000, the TBWG, as an agency-level binational working group, has involved 
border states and provinces. Inasmuch as the BBWG, as described in the BBV, is expected to 
“…where appropriate, rely upon existing bilaterial border-related groups, for implementation,” it 
can be hoped that there is at least a foot in the door towards addressing this well-placed concern. 
A second example, also from the experience of the TBWG, is that the working group has 
acknowledged some of the limitations of its agency-based composition—specifically the 
consequence that it must keep its actions in the realm of what is currently possible under existing 
legislative authority rather then actively promoting changes that would require a modified legal 
foundation. To acknowledge this in a way that preserves space for discussion of alternatives and 
creative solutions (topics that might fall under the BBV’s phrasing, “opportunities to integrate our 
efforts,” the TBWG added a Policy Subcommittee. The committee is certainly not “the missing 
mechanism” for bringing higher levels of our administrations or legislators into a hybrid process, but 
it does provide a platform to mutually acknowledge and document the shortcomings of existing 
authority alongside declared goals.  
Lastly, some states and provinces have, over the last several years, established their own executive-
level, declaration-based initiatives. While most Canadian provinces or territories share a border with 
the United States (8 of 13 or 62 percent) only 9 of 50 U.S states (18 percent) share a border with 
Canada. So, it is worth considering how these emerging arrangements and resulting collaborations 
can help build and sustain the political will and follow-through that has proven more difficult to 
sustain (as Sands explains) at the federal level in the U.S. 
	 21
3.2.3. State-province initiatives - review 
This section reviews four state-province arrangements. The following section then considers what, 
beyond the intended regional outcomes, theses arrangements could offer towards sustaining national 
objectives (such as the Beyond the Border Vision Declaration) or supporting specific federal level 
programmatic outcomes such as coordinated development of border-investment programs. 
New York – Quebec 
Established: 2002 
Name: Memorandum of Understanding on Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation between 
the Government of the State of New York and the Gouvernment Du Quebec 
Purpose: To enhance cooperation in economic development, transportation, Science & 
technology, tourism, and security. 
Signatories: The Governor of New York and the Prime Minister of Quebec. 
Actions: The agreement was signed at the conclusion of the first Quebec – New York 
Economic Summit. Subsequent economic summits have been held in 2003, 2005 and 
2008. In addition, Quebec and New York have held Border Summits in 2002, 2003 
and 2006 to specifically focus on transportation issues affecting our mutual border. 
Each of the six points under the transportation article of the MoU have been 
accomplished. 
Status: The agreement is still in force.  
Vermont – Quebec 
Established: 2003 
Name: Cooperation Agreement between the Gouvernement du Quebec and the Government of the State of 
Vermont 
Purpose: To strengthen ties and increase cooperation in the fields of economic development, 
energy, the environment, security, justice, tourism, and transportation. 
Signatories: The Governor of Vermont and the Prime Minister of Quebec. 
Actions:  The agreement has been the basis for annual meetings between the Governor and 
the Prime Minister to update them on progress, changes, or new initiatives, and 
reaffirm commitments. Most of the transportation items in the agreement have been 
addressed or continue to be collaborative efforts.  
Most, of the items in the agreement have been addressed or continue to be 
collaborative efforts. The Ministère des Transports du Québec and the Vermont 
Agency of Transportation continue to collaborate directly and hold an annual 
meeting between the agencies’ leadership to review mutual interests and cooperation 
on transportation and cross-border travel. 
Status:  The agreement is still in force. 
Saskatchewan – Montana 
Established: 2004 
Name: Saskatchewan-Montana Intergovernmental Accord  
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Purpose: To provide a basis for working together to address issues of mutual interest 
including economic development and commerce, agriculture and food (animal health 
and safety), transportation (regulations, environmental issues, “best practices” and 
corridor development), energy, research and development, and trade. 
Signatories: The Governor of Montana and Premier of Saskatchewan 
Actions:  Focus on border travel. 
Status: Active with both the official legislative members of government and/or in 
legislature-to-legislature arrangements. 
Washington – British Columbia 
Established: 2005 
Name: Memorandum of Cooperation between the Province of British Columbia and the State of 
Washington.  
Purpose: To foster ongoing cooperation on issues of mutual interest 
Signatories: The Governor of New York and the Premier of British Columbia 
Actions:  Follow-on agreements have identified numerous program and project improvements 
to be cooperatively advanced. 2006 follow on agreement: BC-WA Transportation 
Protocol Agreement. 2008 memoranda signed: Border Action Plan, Alternative Fuels 
Distribution, Greening the Border, Tourism, & Public Safety. In 2009, the Governor and 
Premier signed The Framework for Transportation, Competitiveness & Prosperity. With 
regard to transportation, this last framework also established the Joint 
Transportation Executive Committee to deliver on the framework’s commitment to 
establishing an appropriate management structure around the state and provincial 
governments’ interest in advancing specific projects and policies. 
 In the years following the BC-WA MoC, the signatory government leaders have also 
been cooperatively active in advocating policy positions to their respective federal 
governments. Key examples include pushing for delay of the U.S. Western 
Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI – the “passport requirement”), U.S. and 
Canadian approvals of enhanced driver’s license (EDL) programs, and, most 
recently, urging of the Canadian federal government to waive “cost-recovery” fees 
for cross-border passenger rail inspections in Vancouver. 
Status:  The BC-WA agreements are considered active and are being supported by the 
appointed department heads and staff (such as the JTEC). While there has not been 
a binational cabinet meeting since the election of a new government in BC, 
management level meetings and project work continue. 
3.2.4. State-province initiatives - observations 
The state-province arrangements reviewed above, and actions they have fostered, illustrate 
commonalities and differences and highlight ways these initiatives could be embraced to help 
advance U.S.-Canada federal-federal initiatives. 
These arrangements are relatively recent with the earliest being signed in 2002. While examples of 
regional collaboration on cross-border transportation had started to improve earlier, additional 
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motivating factors likely contributed to the political interest in broader, subnational executive 
agreements. The 2002 & 2003 agreements (NY, VT, and QC) likely reflect the parties’ interest in 
maintaining strong economic ties in the context of increasing security following the September 2001 
terrorist attacks. In 2004, Saskatchewan and Montana implemented an Intergovernmental Accord 
addressing economic and transportation issues but also responding to the urgent issue of that time, 
the region’s response to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow disease”). The 
series of WA-BC agreements, beginning in 2005, was likely influenced by the region’s anticipation of 
the 2010 Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver/Whistler, BC. Nevertheless, all of the agreements 
cover a significant amount of cross-border transportation and trade issues as part of the agenda. 
While state and provincial agencies are involved in delivering the products identified in these 
cooperative agreements, communications and decisions about future direction and scope is managed 
executive-level offices closer to the governors or premiers themselves. 
The reviewed agreements, while they include terms for withdrawal, do not have expiration dates. 
They provide a potentially ongoing source of support for cooperative efforts. They are often “kept 
current” through periodic summits and the appending of follow-on agreements on specific 
objectives. Whether or not parties to these agreements continue to cite them as the basis for 
collaboration can be a function of political and bureaucratic continuity. But, as with federal-federal 
initiatives, the mix of elected executives and agency bureaucrats involved in carrying out shared goals 
can diversify the base of interest and increase the continuity of purpose. 
The state-province pairs’ engagement in federal advocacy varies. In their agreement, NY and QC list 
a mutual interest in funding some large-scale investments which would likely involve an interest in 
federal funding assistance. The list also includes an interest in pursuing a [U.S. Congressional] high-
priority corridor designation; presumably requiring some action by the U.S. Congress. Aside from 
this objective however federal advocacy is not a primary objective or outcome of the NY-QC 
agreement.2 
The VT-QC agreement includes some more specific language related to federal agency policy and 
operations. 
“Collaborate, within the limits of their mandates, with American and Canadian federal 
departments and agencies with authority in cross-border matters, notably by taking action on 
the following projects involving border stations:” 
However, it’s notable that the federal engagement being discussed here would not involve federal 
legislative bodies or individual legislators. 
A side note of particular interest to this paper is the VT-QC agreement language on federal border 
investment programs: 
“Exchanging information on Canadian federal transportation initiatives and the 
reauthorization of the American federal TEA-21 program and analyzing possible avenues for 
cooperation with regard to future and present TEA-21 cross-border programs.” 
Acknowledging, at the time, that both national governments were advancing border-investment 
programs, VT and QC are here indicating an interest to proactively identify areas of future federal 
programs that they could influence towards mutual benefit. While this is not a clear indication that 
																																																								
2 Regional stakeholders are also often involved in both identifying and advancing objectives listed in these 
cross-border memoranda. With regard to new border crossing construction and corridor-designations, 
regional chambers of commerce were also very involved and in discussion with federal legislators. 
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the state and province would jointly solicit legislative support from federal lawmakers, it does 
indicate an interest in complementary border investment programs – the scenario explored by this 
paper. 
While WA and BC did not include elements of federal advocacy in their initial memorandum (2005), 
their follow-on cooperative agreements have included descriptions of a federal advocacy role. In 
their 2008 MoU titled Action Plan on Border Management, the WA Governor and BC Premier included 
two sections that defined a federal advocacy role. Generally, section VII (Leadership to Secure Action by 
Federal Authorities) acknowledged that various elements of a border strategy are the responsibility of 
“our respective federal agencies” and that therefore the Governor and Premier needed to work 
together to communicate a consistent message with Washington, DC and Ottawa. Specifically, 
section IV (Action on the Enhanced Driver’s License Program) committed the WA and BC executives to 
communicating a list of details regarding the two sub-national governments’ preferences on 
compliance with the then-pending U.S. Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) (as well as 
details of Canada’s federal cooperation with future U.S. WHTI regulations). 
In these examples, state and provincial executives, especially working within an agreement-based 
framework, can, unlike regional transportation agencies, appropriately advocate for federal policy and 
legislative change. A scenario can be imagined in which this type of political engagement could be 
connected to various national-level binational objectives. A first example is provided by the above-
quoted VT-QC section on border-transportation investment program planning. If governors and 
premiers have issued a statement of joint interest in our respective national programs, it would seem 
logical to engage them on coordinated planning for improved symmetry for future program design. 
Secondly, these agreement show an understanding that binational systems (i.e. border crossings) are 
realized through multiple levels of government (state & provincial and federal), it seems reasonable 
to expect that state and provincial leaders could be motivated advocates for components of 
binational declarations like the Beyond the Border Vision. In his paper The Canada Gambit (discussed 
in section 6.1.2) Christopher Sands asserts that one reason to have low expectations for the Beyond 
the Border Vision is the lack of political will that it and past declarations have faced. And, while 
that’s true, it also seems that border state and provincial leaders have demonstrated that they could 
be a plentiful source of the previously inadequate political will. More direct state-province 
involvement would increase ongoing attention to progress on declared goals. States and provincial 
leaders could also push for the involvement of their respective federal legislators. Especially in the 
U.S., it can be difficult to maintain federal legislators’ attention to the President’s initiatives—
especially, in this example, where a minority of senators and representatives feel their constituencies 
are directly impacted3. 
3.3. Alternatives for advancement 
Having identified the basic goals of 1) improving the approach both countries could take towards 
complementary program development, and 2) improving institutional capacity for sustaining 
bilaterial focus on shared objectives, this section will identify tools and resources for advancing these 
goals and then present some possible strategies for advancing coordinated border investment 
programs. 
																																																								
3 Not to discount the fact that a majority of states’ largest trading partner is Canada, only eleven of 50 
states share a border with Canada. 
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3.3.1. Tools for supporting international cooperation 
This section reviews an array of tools our governments use to support international, and in the case 
of this paper’s focus, bilateral collaboration. This review of the range of mechanisms employed is 
intended to inform the subsequent subjective discussion and identification of a few strategies for 
supporting symmetrical program development and institutional capacity noted above. 
Figure 1 below splits an array of sample mechanisms and institutions by two dimensions: formality 
(from cooperative/informal to binding/enforceable) and level of government involved (federal 
executive, federal agency, and sub-national/other). This particular breakdown is primarily informed 
by the documented perspective of the U.S. State Department (especially with regard to formal 
agreements) but the resulting content illustrates a useful context of recent mechanism entered into 
by U.S. and Canadian government entities.  
Figure 1: Matrix of International Mechanisms for cross-border cooperation.  
 
Sources: US Department of State (C175 Handbook), de Eyre 2009. 
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Treaties and international agreements: The most formal mechanism is a treaty—legally binding 
and enforceable under international law. From the U.S. perspective, two other types of international 
agreements exist – those pursuant to legislation (based in passage of corresponding laws by the U.S. 
Congress), and agreements based on the constitutional authority of the President (and otherwise accordant with 
U.S. law). The NAFTA, for example, is, in the U.S., an agreement given force by follow-on 
Congressional legislation rather than a treaty based in ratification by the Senate. Writers such as 
Kirton and Guebert (reviewed above) characterize international agreements as “hard-law 
instruments.” 
An interesting treaty-based example for this paper is the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between the 
U.S. and Canada which established the International Joint Commission (IJC). The IJC is a binational 
commission authorized and funded by our governments to “help prevent and resolve disputes 
relating to the use and quality of boundary waters (the Great Lakes and their connecting waterways) 
and to advise Canada and the United States on related questions.”(IJC website: ijc.org) While the 
purpose of the IJC is significantly different and more focused than the range of binational border 
transportation and infrastructure objectives surveyed in this paper, it does provide an important 
example of a long-standing binational institution. Today, the IJC consists of four commissioners and 
two chairs and, between the Washington, DC office; the Ottawa office; and the regional office in 
Windsor, ON; has a professional staff of 47. 
Another hard-law approach to supporting binational cooperation (again based in a U.S. example) is 
Congressional pre-authorization of actions by sub-national entities (ex. states or newly 
created/legislated commissions). An example of this is the International Bridge Act of 1972. (de 
Eyre, pg 2). In cases such as these, the Federal government is not necessarily the primary party to 
the agreement but the sub-national entity is authorized to take on specific roles and commitments 
that Congress finds do not challenge the primacy of the federal government in international affairs. 
Non-binding (declarations, statements, memoranda, etc.): As partially illustrated by the varied 
list of examples, this has become a broad, well-populated category. Most recently seen with U.S. 
President Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Harper’s signing of the Beyond the Border 
declaration in February of 2011. 
While not binding, not dependent on existing legal authorities of each country, and not enforceable, 
these mechanisms effectively memorialize shared objectives. Rather than built on the “hard-law” 
language of “shall” and “will,” these mechanisms document mutual intentions and provide a 
framework for cooperative actions. 
Moving down the level-of-government dimension of Figure 1, non-binding mechanisms are also 
what federal agencies have used to support bilateral undertakings. The 2000 MoU between the U.S. 
Department of Transportation and Transport Canada is the most pertinent example for this paper. 
And, while the signatories are often at the “political level,”—ministers or secretaries appointed by 
the respective executive leaders—subsequent action is undertaken by the agencies than “from the 
top.” 
Canadian provinces and U.S. states have also increasingly employed cross-border agreements and 
declarations to support shared regional objectives and specific undertakings. The Canada-U.S. Law 
Institute (CUSLI) prepared an excellent review of the use and legal basis of these sub-national 
instruments (de Eyre, 2009). A few distinct types of state-province mechanisms can be identified. 
First, as mentioned above, U.S. states have been given pre-approved federal congressional authority 
to enter into “treaty-like” agreements for specific objectives. Secondly, U.S. states (especially along 
the Canada border) and provinces have developed or adopted their own legal bases for forming 
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implementing agreements (cost-sharing and construction partnerships for example). While 
commonly accepted as subordinate to treaties, the documents themselves, especially when funding 
arrangements are involved, will often identify a process for dispute resolution and a court of 
jurisdiction. Lastly, states and provinces have established broad declarations to foster collaboration 
on various shared interests.  
Ongoing cooperative efforts: Figure 1’s column of cooperative efforts--relatively informal working 
groups and coalitions--are not typically creations of hard-law or soft-law agreements but more 
organic coalitions formed around shared needs. A “hard-law” exception to this is the U.S.-Canada 
Interparliamentary Group (IPG) established in U.S and Canadian legislation in 1959. While the IPG 
provides an example of how our two countries’ legislative bodies have enacted a binational 
mechanism which could in theory provide a distinct capacity for delivering coordinated legislative 
attention to ongoing border planning and investment, the IPG does not pursue this type of activity. 
And, while there seems to be a fairly active contingent of Canadian parliamentarians, evidence of 
sustained involvement among the U.S. Congress is scarce. Thus, the IPG is acknowledged here 
more as an existing, legislative framework than as an active channel for improving cross-border 
governance. 
The federal-level agency example given in the chart is the TBWG. While the mandate for regular 
meetings between U.S. & Canadian transportation agencies was established in a formal MOU, the 
TBWG is itself not defined in a formally approved document. Similarly, state/provincial regional 
examples given above are creations of soft-law or even less formal. 
The important connection between these less-formal cooperative efforts and the more formal 
mechanisms (declarations and resulting national laws and policies) is that the ability for project-
oriented coalitions to advance solutions is greatly affected by the degree of policy-alignment 
achieved by our national governments and agencies. Conversely, regional coalitions have been 
increasingly recognized in recent executive-level declarations as important contributors to careful 
planning and project-delivery. 
3.3.2. Strategies for advancing symmetrical program development 
Having identified both long-standing and emergent resources for binational collaboration, this 
section proposes some specific strategies (applications of identified resources) for advancing the 
creation of symmetrical border transportation investment programs. Again, this hypothetical 
objective is both a practical exploration (of potential interest to the U.S.-Canada Transportation 
Border Working Group) and an academic exercise (it provides a context for evaluating the 
institutional feasibility of a defined step towards cross-border facilitation but, at the same time 
ignores a lot of other issues that would need to be resolved in the border operational environment 
such as interagency deliberations between transportation and inspection. 
The following strategies are each concluded with a brief assessment of how they address some of the 
persistent challenges discussed in the earlier sections: lack of bureaucracies’ legal authorities to 
explore new approaches, political cycles, and lack of political will.  
1. Continue to build the foundation: For the hypothetical coordinated border-investment 
program described in this paper, the TBWG is a key, existing, government-to-government 
resource. It would probably be better positioned to address the development of coordinated 
investment programs if it first more formally documented an interest in complementary program 
development to its Action Plan or chartering MoU. As noted in section 3.1.4, “development of 
new programs” is a listed intention in the 2000 MOU. If an interest were identified in 
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pursuing development of coordinated investment programs, it might be beneficial to update 
the MoU accordingly. 
Assessment: This strategy, without new mechanisms to engage legislators, would still 
improve the TBWG’s ability to have a longer view discussion and possibly document 
benefits of more symmetrical programs (or whatever the programmatic objective might be). 
But, without a clearer mandate for drafting new authorities and planning for program design 
and implementation, participating agencies will be appropriately reluctant to test the bounds 
of prerogative or get in front of their political-level executives. 
2. Pursue opportunities availed by the BBV Declaration: The clearest opportunity availed 
by the BBV is the section on “planning together” ( port-of-entry committees, funding and 
building border infrastructure, etc. -- listed in this paper as Citation 4 in section 5.1.1). 
TBWG is an appropriate body to act on this intention and make suggestions for expanding 
on this area in the forthcoming Beyond the Border Action Plan. 
In addition to having an obvious level of support in the declaration itself, an advancement 
strategy based on the BBV’s executive level status should aim to identify new sources of 
support from the offices of the U.S. President and Canadian Prime Minister. Could cross-
border working groups, like TBWG, be granted more sanctioned prerogative to identify and 
suggest needed agency authorities? Can better channels to federal legislative bodies be 
facilitated if needed (and politically feasible)? 
The points of contact and range of reasonable expectations should come into clearer focus 
as the first BBV Action Plan documents are issued – expected this fall (2011). 
Assessment: Vesting a [somewhat] separate institution like TBWG with an interest in 
specific outcomes (like those cited above), in addition to the individual agencies, may provide 
advantages. While TBWG is comprised of U.S. and Canadian federal agencies who would be 
involved at varying levels regardless, TBWG provides some dimensions that could facilitate 
attention. 
 TBWG’s long standing semiannual meeting schedule has also been a fitting venue 
for binational-project progress reports (Border Wait-time Working Group, 
commercial vehicle regulatory alignment, etc.). To the extent this schedule provides a 
community of interest and a timeline, it can provide additional incentive to advance 
initiatives. 
 Related somewhat to the next suggested strategy, TBWG involves states and 
provinces. The good reasons for this are explained in section 3.1.2. But aspects of 
advancing the BBV will hinge on state and provincial collaboration. So, it would be 
efficient to acknowledge that TBWG already has a forum and relationships in place 
to expedite the necessary dialog and collaboration through national and sub-national 
levels of government. 
3. Regularize involvement of state and provincial leaders: At the project level, direct 
involvement of state and provincial transportation agencies is absolutely essential. This is the 
basic reason that FHWA and TC have involved state and provincial transportation 
departments in TBWG from the very beginning. But based on states’ and provinces’ proven 
interest in collaborating across the border on strategic and policy-based initiatives between 
their respective executive offices (as well as coordinating infrastructure projects at the agency 
level), it would be reasonable to consider some structured involvement of interested sub-
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national government leaders (governors and premiers) with ongoing federal-level initiatives. 
As indicated above, states and provinces have, with regard to federal border policies and 
investments been active proponents and advocates. But it is this broader array of interest 
that could be an important source of political will for sustaining sufficient attention on 
declared goals. 
Assessment: Past binational declarations have produced notable outcomes (ex. NEXUS, 
FAST) but many objectives remain stuck and usually re-appear in the next (and current) 
declaration (ex. perimeter strategies, entry-exit information exchange, joint-facilities and 
programs, program harmonization, etc.). This is not a surprising outcome when the 
participants in the process are the two elected executive branches of our federal 
governments. The nature of these institutions dictates that politics, election cycles, and the 
reality of competing issues will challenge the best intentions for follow-through. And even 
though the agencies of our executive branches are typically charged with attending to the 
details of advancing declared goals, meaningful collaboration between two sovereign, law-
based systems will inevitably require actions beyond the authority of these agencies. And the 
more our binational goals call out the need for innovation (appropriately), the more our 
success will benefit from legislative involvement. And that requires political will. Thus, if 
state and provincial leaders are more regularly involved in supporting outcomes, progress on 
declared objectives would receive more consistent attention and federal elected officials 
might enjoy the additional political grounding that comes with an important constituency 
that is openly invested in the outcome. 
State and provincial leaders could also be an effective bridge between federal executives 
working on BBV goals and federal legislators from border states and provinces. 
To bring this line of thinking back to how it could improve the prospects of developing 
symmetrical border investment programs, states’ and provinces’ inevitable central role in 
designing and constructing large portions of border-related investments renders them very 
appropriate champions of creative solutions between our two federal governments. 
State and provincial leaders could urge their federal legislators not only to lend support and 
supporting legislation but also to coordinate with their cross-border counterparts on 
coordinated legislative solutions. This is explored a bit more below. 
4. Consider strategies for engaging federal legislators: As mentioned above, state and 
provincial leaders could be a logical avenue for involvement of federal legislators whose 
districts cover border regions or have other relatively stronger U.S.-Canada economic 
connections. Whether via state leaders, existing agency-based working groups, or facilitated 
by legislative offices, the prospect of federal legislators becoming more directly involved in 
U.S.-Canada coordination is appropriate to consider as a possible strategy. If our countries 
are looking for new solutions for improving border management—between two sovereign 
states and their agencies—continuing to forgo integrated evaluation of underlying legal 
authorities will likely guarantee that results are incremental and rarely reflective of our best 
thinking. 
Assessment: In The Canada Gambit, discussed above, Sands notes that President Obama and 
Prime Minister Harper have, with the BBV, chosen to limit the dialog to areas within the 
statutory authority of agencies so it wouldn’t be necessary to seek prior approval of the U.S. 
Congress for negotiations. But, short of setting the stage for a more formal executive 
agreement or treaty-level instrument (briefly discussed above), federal legislators with more 
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direct interests in border facilitation could conceivably work to introduce and support 
incremental legislative changes that might go a long way towards enabling solutions 
identified by federal agencies, states and provinces, and other stakeholders. 
To relate this thinking to the advancement of complementary border investment programs, 
the employment of this strategy could be envisioned as open discussions about 
corresponding draft-legislation that results in legislative authorization of such things as 
matching timelines, project priorities, eligible-use criteria, etc. But, while this type of scenario 
may be feasible, some body, some office needs to be tracking progress and facilitating 
communication. This type of role may be appropriately handled by the Beyond the Border 
Working Group (BBWG) or, with regard to a more specific, cross-border transportation 
investment program, perhaps TBWG could be a hub for this kind of interaction. 
If a more direct connection between legislatures were desired, such an interaction could be 
imagined in the above-mentioned Interparliamentary Group. A suggestion for a new 
binational legislative mechanism was recently made in an article by Brian Crowley stating, 
“If, for example, American politicians are finally cluing in to the importance of an open 
border to their own workers, the time has come to create a joint committee of Congress and 
Parliament charged with oversight of the Canada-U.S. relationship, holding hearings, issuing 
reports, and taking their newly acquired knowledge and relationships back to their respective 
bodies.” 
Conclusions 
Considering the above strategies as solutions to broadly characterized challenges like election cycles, 
lack of political will, and bureaucratic inflexibility probably seems wishful and untested. But the 
potential merit of these strategies is better assessed in this paper by developing a scenario in which 
they are applied to the narrowly characterized hypothetical repeatedly referred to above– 
development of symmetrical complementary border investment programs. 
Such a scenario, leaving many administrative details and consultative requirements to the side for 
now, could play out, generally, as follows: 
Step 1. TBWG participants document discussion and conclusions regarding (presumably) 
the benefits of considering the development of more complementary border investment 
programs. 
Step 2. Possibly working within the context of the BBWG, the TBWG lead agencies (US 
Department of Transportation and Transport Canada) pursue (and presumably affect) better 
articulation of a mandate for coordinated program development (not difficult to imagine 
given words to this effect in the current MoU). 
Step 3. In coordination with their delegate participants in TBWG, state and provincial 
executives (governors’ and premiers’ offices) could open a dialog with their regions’ federal 
legislators in support of (presumably) the emerging effort to develop deliberately 
symmetrical border investment programs and development of a process in which each 
country’s legislature can cross-reference evolving legislation and work towards 
complimentary program features, criteria, and authorities. 
Step 4. If both resulting U.S. and Canadian programs still require meaningful agency rules-
making or development of administrative guidance, tracking the symmetry of such details 
could happen within the TBWG. 
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The above scenario doesn’t take advantage of all the strategies suggested in the previous section. 
The most questionably feasible step seems to be affecting productive and coordinated engagement 
of federal legislators on this issue. More robust mechanisms to address this need could resemble the 
Interparliamentary Group (a legislated framework). Alternatively a fully independent commission 
(legislated into existence like the IJC) could provide a mutually-approved coordinator. To clarify, the 
intention here would be to provide a mechanism for communication on policy development that, 
because two countries are involved, often necessitates legislative adjustments. This mechanism would 
track and support complementary legislating – leaving administration of resulting, national programs 
to each country’s institutions. 
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